One of the several questions that frequently come up during side-bar conversations at Security Forums has to do with the progress being made by the United States in Iraq.  Those of you who recall the Vietnam War and the ultimate failure of “vietnamization” have been interested in whether I see a repeat of that unfortunate eventuality occurring in Iraq, after the drawdown of U.S. forces. 

I’m pleased by the question.  It shows both some understanding of military history and a concern about the U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terror. 

You will recall that “vietnamization” was a combination of (a) providing weapons, equipment, ammunition, supplies and money to the Republic of Vietnam, while (b) training their military and law enforcement elements to be self-sufficient and fully functional with minimum U.S. military support.  When,  in the early 1970’s, the U.S. Congress cut back on financial support for the Vietnamese, spare parts availability and ammunition supplies became problems that broke the camel’s back, so to speak.  What caused the camel to be weak in the first place is that there were not sufficient numbers of well-prepared local police elements, national-guard units and counter-terrorism forces in place. 

The following article, provided by Colonel (retired) Bill Olds, an advisor to the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Bureau, sheds some light on the status of this vital component of a free-standing and sustainable Iraqi government.  I hope you find it illuminating.

Click Here to view the article