Guest Column
September/October

Perspectives on Pipeline Politics: Russia's Strategic Leverage on European Energy Security

by Dr. Robert McCreight
George Washington University

We know that Russia exerts a potential stranglehold on most of the EU’s oil and gas supplies but we also assume that Moscow will tread carefully to guarantee that its malevolent intentions are adequately disguised as nothing more than rapacious capitalism.  In a system where it appears that everyone wins, that all affected parties benefit, and the essentials for modern life remain untouched, Russia is in a favored position which provides the EU with few alternatives.

However, the illusion of rampant mercantile largesse should not obscure the fact that Moscow holds a genuine blackmail option through its lucrative oil-gas via pipelines.  Russia knows competitors may eventually come along and place real competitive leverage against them one day, but we delude ourselves if we fail to grasp Moscow’s predominant long term interests.  To be sure, the EU and its paper mache ESDP [EuroSecurity and Defense Policy] provide a toothless deterrent to an obstinate and obdurate Moscow.  Only under hapless conditions of duress would EU leaders deign to whine about the importance of NATO protection as their homes, businesses and autos run dry.  It is a risky and foolhardy proposition to argue that even a weak Russian military cannot deploy an effective special force to defend its pipeline interests anywhere it wants.

Remembering the Russian antics in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia earlier in late 2008 where pipeline interests elicited a fearsome and cyber-drenched Russian response, one must ask whether these were random episodes of a misguided Putin or reflect a much more fundamental issue.  Russia is keenly aware that rival pipelines expected to run through SouthEastern Europe to EU markets will make the whole game of oil-gas monopoly much more challenging, but they have said carefully that the several former CIS states through which pipelines will pass are actually within Moscow’s designated ‘sphere of influence.’  Hence, a new perspective is warranted.  Moscow is also willing to play brinksmanship over the extent to which disruptions in Ukraine’s sovereignty, and Georgia’s, over the pipeline issue become the new clarion cry of American policymakers and outraged Pentagon bosses.  Moscow is betting on a sleepy reaction.

When we look carefully at the map of Turkey and its eastern neighbors, we realize that a new chessboard is there for Moscow’s exploitation.   Turkey is fully aware of its Montreux Convention options but Moscow invoked the treaty during its short expedition into Georgia, ironically placing the long term agreement that Turkey import Russian oil-gas in some jeopardy.  We can only speculate what this presages for the Baku-Ceyhan network or the proposed SouthStream and NABUCCO pipeline alternatives which promise to open up competition for Russia. To simply assume this will all fall into place in a tidy bundle fails to account for Russian propensities and its colorful history.  The seeds of conflict lie within this mosaic.

Of course, it is tempting to speculate that the EU will arise from its stupor and see the value of developing an ‘eyes-wide-open’ energy security policy that puts NATO in the driver’s seat as the guarantor of oil-gas for the indefinite future.  But EU citizens often drift into socialist reveries from time to time and subscribe to the fantasy that Russia will never let the furnaces and engines of Paris, Milan and Stuttgart run idle. This is a belief among a startling number of otherwise educated EU leaders, many of whom claim the EU’s energy dilemma is not as bad as one perceives it.

Some EU states have slowly recognized their neighbors to the south—especially Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and maybe Algeria harbor significant oil-gas reserves worth exploiting.  However, don’t expect a major shift in public sentiment anytime soon as the wistful attachment to Russian pipelines is hard to dismiss.  When President Obama pressed the ‘reset’ button earlier in 2009, we in the West construed that to mean a new era of US-Russia relations.  To the contrary, in Moscow, that gesture was seen as tacit recognition of Russia’s own Monroe Doctrine regarding the former CIS states—and with it the presumptive domain over pipelines wherever they roam. 

It remains difficult to get perspective on the issues embedded in Russia’s enduring interest in her pipelines. Just ascertaining Moscow’s real motives becomes a paradox as we attempt to determine if Russia’s overall military posture is weak and eroding, or clandestinely reforming.  It is very hard to prove that recent upgrades and refinements in Russian military prowess, although limited, indicate a stern commitment to surgical intervention in the CIS and along its pipeline frontier.  We have seen Russian linkage of US missile defense proposals in Poland and the Czech Republic to the ultimate fate of oil-gas supplies to the EU.  We have also witnessed recent military exercises in the Baltic where Russian forces were dispatched to secure oil platforms at risk.  What conclusions can be drawn?

To grasp pipeline politics in the EU, one needs to understand what Moscow’s actual and long-term intentions are with respect to future oil-gas revenues, pipeline security and the relentless elimination of competition.  Perhaps it is too soon to determine what Moscow really wants in the EU market and what it will settle for.  We can study Russia’s abiding interest in SouthWest Asia and the Arctic as proof of Russia's inclination to assure itself of a dominant energy position apart from anything it desires in the EU.  To do so however, may blind us to the real strategic interests Moscow wants to promote and protect. After all, taking Baku by itself settles all strategic questions handily as there remains no other way for oil-gas from the Caspian to reach Amsterdam or Vienna.  But that would be too extreme.  Instead we should focus on the EU and how it can assure itself a reliable energy supply when so many others have their own ideas about how to meet that need.